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Introduction
HAITI AND THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC share a common border
on the small island of Hispaniola, as well as a long history of unrest
and distrust.1 While the populations of both countries are roughly
equal, Haiti is approximately half the size of the Dominican Republic,
and is troubled by extreme poverty and political upheaval.2 These fac-
tors have motivated Haitians to migrate to the Dominican Republic in
search of work.3 Today, Haitians comprise sixty percent of the Domin-
ican Republic’s agricultural work force and much of its construction
work force.4
While some Haitians in the Dominican Republic have migrated
illegally, others are the native born children of migrants, and still
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would also like to acknowledge Brian Concannon for his patience and unfaltering
commitment to the Haitian people—without your help I never would have opened my eyes
these issues. Thank you to my friends at the Law Review for their perspective and help with
this Article. Most importantly, a thank you to my family, and to Peter for their incredible
support.
1. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “ILLEGAL PEOPLE”: HAITIANS AND DOMINICO-HAITIANS IN
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2002) [hereinafter ILLEGAL PEOPLE], http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/3cf2429a4.html.
2. Id. The CIA World Factbook cites Haiti’s size as 27,750 square kilometers with a
population of 9,035,536, while it cites the Dominican Republic as having 48,670 square
kilometers and a population of 9,650,054. U.S. CIA, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2009,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.
3. See ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 1.
4. Elizabeth Eames Roebling, Haiti-Dominican Republic: Neighbors, But Not Friends, HAI-
TIANALYSIS.COM, http://www.haitianalysis.com/international-relations/haiti-dominican-re-
public-neighbours-but-not-friends (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
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others are victims of human trafficking.5 Regardless of their back-
grounds, people of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic are
subject to racism, xenophobia, and an unfriendly socio-political struc-
ture that systematically denies them their labor and immigration
rights.6 The Dominican Republic’s immigration and labor policies—
and its poor enforcement of these laws—undermine the rights of Hai-
tian workers in the Dominican Republic and perpetuate cycles of
poverty.
The most recent and far-reaching change in way the Dominican
Republic does business occurred with the enactment of the Domini-
can Republic–Central America–United States Free Trade Agreement
(“DR-CAFTA” or the “Agreement”). The DR-CAFTA establishes free
trade between the United States, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.7 Signed on Au-
gust 5, 2004, it represents the first free trade agreement between the
United States and a group of small developing countries.8 The U.S.
Trade Representative (“USTR”) anticipated that the Agreement will
create “new economic opportunities by eliminating tariffs, opening
markets, reducing barriers to services, promoting transparency, and
establishing state-of-the-art rules for 21st century commerce.”9 The
USTR hopes that, by lowering tariffs and reducing other trade barri-
ers, trade and investment will be facilitated between the parties, thus
furthering “regional integration.”10 But as trade and investment ex-
pand in the region, many are worried that workers’ rights will be ig-
nored in the push towards economic expansion.11 This could be
5. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC (2009)
[hereinafter 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT], http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/
wha/119157.htm.
6. See id.
7. Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, H.R.
DOC. 109-36 (2005) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA].
8. U.S. Trade Representative, CAFTA-DR (Dominican Republic-Central America
FTA), http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-
republic-central-america-fta (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE UNITED STATES-DOMINICAN REPUBLICAN-CENTRAL
AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT FALLS SHORT ON WORKERS’ RIGHTS (2005) [hereinafter
DR-CAFTA FALLS SHORT] (submitted as written testimony for Implementation of the Domini-
can Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 109th Sess. (2005)), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/arms/
hearing0405/hearing0405.pdf; see also Press Release, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi Statement
in Opposition to CAFTA (May 28, 2004), http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press//releases/
May04/CAFTA052804.html.
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particularly damaging to the Haitian labor force, which is already ex-
ploited under Dominican law.
The USTR—recognizing the link between labor rights and
trade—has added labor protections to every free trade agreement
(“FTA”) since 1993.12 In addition, the President, under the Bipartisan
Trade Promotion Authority, or “fast track” authority, is required to
consider “respect for worker rights” as a negotiating objective in all
U.S. FTAs.13 In some ways, DR-CAFTA appears to promote the im-
provement of labor rights among the member states. For example,
labor rights are included within the main body of the Agreement,
rather than in a side agreement.14 By comparison, the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement15 (“NAFTA”) did not include labor protec-
tions in the main body—they were contained in a side agreement
drafted as an afterthought.16 Some also argue that it encourages states
to enforce their laws, and builds the Dominican Republic’s ability to
monitor and enforce labor rights,17 which arguably shows signs of in-
ternational progress towards enforcing important labor concerns
through trade agreements.18 However, a closer examination reveals
that the alluring promises of DR-CAFTA are not progressive, but are
instead limited by flimsy standards and weak enforcement provisions
that leave parties with no obligation to improve or even enforce their
own labor standards. In a country with few labor protections, DR-
CAFTA may increase industrial production and demand for labor,
without necessarily protecting workers’ rights. This calls into question
whether this Agreement is a functional way to enforce or improve la-
bor rights in contracting states.
Part I provides a background to the anti-Haitian sentiment in the
Dominican Republic and explores the arguments for and against the
12. MARY JANE BOLLE, CONGRESSIONAL REPORTING SERVICES, DR-CAFTA LABOR RIGHTS
ISSUES 1–2 (2006).
13. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, §§ 2102(a)(6), 2102 (b)(11)(A), 116 Stat.
933, 994, 1000 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802(a)(6), 3802 (b)(11) (2006)).
14. DR-CAFTA, supra 7, art. 16.
15. 43 I.L.M. 1488 (2004).
16. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M.
289, § 605 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA was implemented by the North American
Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993)
(codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301–3473 (2000)).
17. U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Adding Dominican Republic to CAFTA
(2004) [hereinafter Adding DR to CAFTA], available at http://web.archive.org/web/2007
1008112222/www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Fact_Sheets/2004/Section_Index.html.
18. DANIEL GRISWOLD & DANIEL IKENSON, THE CASE FOR CAFTA: CONSOLIDATING CEN-
TRAL AMERICA’S FREEDOM REVOLUTION 12 (2004), available at http://www.freetrade.org/
pubs/briefs/tbp-021.pdf.
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DR-CAFTA labor provisions. Part II compares NAFTA, the Jordan
Free Trade Agreement (“Jordan FTA”), and DR-CAFTA to demon-
strate DR-CAFTA does not advance labor rights. Part III looks to the
realities of NAFTA and the Jordan FTA, and the effects that previous
FTAs have had on laborers. Part IV discusses Dominican laws, workers’
rights violations, and the potential for labor rights enforcement
through DR-CAFTA.
I. Background
A. Haitians in the Dominican Republic
Up to one million Haitians live in the Dominican Republic;19
most are undocumented.20 The Dominican Republic confers citizen-
ship based on jus soli,21 the idea of basing nationality on birthplace.22
However, citizenship is not granted to children of people deemed “in
transit.”23 A crucial 2004 immigration law re-defined all nonresidents
as people “in transit,” thus denying their rights to Dominican nation-
ality.24 Children of Haitian migrants born in the Dominican Republic
fall under this “in transit” category and are systematically denied Do-
minican citizenship.25 Without any claim to citizenship, they are effec-
tively stateless people. Furthermore, Haitians face difficulties in
obtaining birth certificates, which hinders their opportunities to pur-
sue an education.26 This denial of nationality, documentation, and ed-
ucation has created an underclass, one that subjugates the Haitian
population and perpetuates cycles of poverty and exploitation. In ad-
dition, their irregular legal status means that Haitian workers are at
19. REFUGEES INT’L, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, HAITI, AND THE UNITED STATES: PROTECT
RIGHTS, REDUCE STATELESSNESS (2007), available at http://www.refintl.org/policy/field-re-
port/dominican-republic-haiti-and-united-states-protect-rights-reduce-statelessness.
20. Id.
21. Republica Dominicana Constitucion de 2002 tit. III, sec. 1, art. 11(1).
22. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 942 (9th ed. 2009).
23. Republica Dominicana Constitucion de 2002 tit. III, sec. 1, art. 11(1).
24. Ley General para las Migraciones (General Migration Law), art. 36, para. 10
(2004) (DR). The Dominican government has stated this migration law provides that chil-
dren born on Dominican soil to Haitian parents can no longer become Dominican nation-
als. Amnesty Int’l, Dominican Republic: Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review, Sixth
Session of the UPR Working Group of the Human Rights Council, AI Index AMR 27/002/2009,
Apr. 20, 2009. In addition, if a mother cannot prove her migratory status after giving birth
in the Dominican Republic, her child is given a pink birth certificate instead of the normal
white one. Children with pink certificates cannot register for nationality. Amnesty Int’l,
Dominican Republic: A Life in Transit—The Plight of Haitian Migrants and Dominicans of Hai-
tian Descent, AI Index AMR 27/001/07, Mar. 21, 2007, at 18 [hereinafter Amnesty Int’l].
25. Amnesty Int’l, supra note 24, at 17.
26. Id. at 23–24.
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particular risk of exploitation in the expanded work force foreseen by
DR-CAFTA.27
Many Dominicans justify this class structure by pointing to the
perceived differences between Dominicans and Haitians. Although
both countries share a history of slavery and colonization, Domini-
cans, since independence, have identified themselves as “Hispanic”
and Haitians as “black.”28 The sub-director for Haitian Affairs in the
Dominican Migration Department recently insisted that Haitians are
easily identified because they are “poorer,” have “rougher skin,” and
are “much blacker” than Dominicans.29 This division has manifested
violently in the past. Gen. Raphael Trujillo, a Dominican dictator in
the early-twentieth century, took pride in his racism against Haitians.30
In 1937, he ordered the Dominican army to kill all Haitians found
outside the sugar plantations.31 An estimated 20,000 to 25,000 un-
armed Haitians were massacred.32 Still, the Haitian government con-
tinued to contract with Dominican authorities to recruit cane cutters
for a per capita fee.33 The Dominican sugar industry relies heavily on
Haitian labor to this day,34 and is a beneficiary of DR-CAFTA.35
B. The Debate over DR-CAFTA
Proponents of DR-CAFTA are confident that its labor provisions
will protect workers. In March 2004, the USTR stated that the DR-
CAFTA would go “beyond Chile and Singapore FTAs to create a three-
part strategy on worker rights that will ensure effective enforcement of
domestic labor laws, establish a cooperative program to improve labor
laws and enforcement, and build the capacity of the Dominican Re-
public to monitor and enforce labor rights.”36 Others added that all
parties to the DR-CAFTA would be able to maintain or raise their do-
mestic standards through the promotion of trade.37
27. Id. at 9.
28. ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 1.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. MICHELE WUCKER, WHY THE COCKS FIGHT: DOMINICANS, HAITIANS, AND THE STRUG-
GLE FOR HISPANIOLA 14, 44 (1999).
33. See ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 1.
34. Id.
35. U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Fact Sheet on Sugar in CAFTA-DR (2005)
(Within the first year of signing, the Dominican Republic was projected to increase its
sugar market access by 1.2% of U.S. production.).
36. Adding DR to CAFTA, supra note 17.
37. GRISWOLD & IKENSON, supra note 18 at 11.
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On the other hand, Peter Allgeier, the acting USTR, testified to
Congress that the need to improve domestic labor laws in Central
America was a chief problem in the region for the USTR—one that
required “more attention and resources.”38 Critics of the DR-CAFTA
labor provisions agree domestic standards are a chief concern.39 They
argue that DR-CAFTA does not give labor rights the attention and
resources they need because it fails to require compliance with basic
international norms.40 Specifically, there are twenty-seven identified
areas where labor standards fall short in the region, including the
right to strike, that will not be improved by the Agreement.41
II. A Comparison of NAFTA, Jordan FTA, and DR-CAFTA
The United States has linked labor protections to FTAs since
1993.42 This began with NAFTA, which includes workers’ rights in a
side agreement called the North American Agreement on Labor Co-
operation (“NAALC”).43 Subsequent agreements include the multi-
lateral DR-CAFTA, and bilateral agreements with Jordan, Chile, Singa-
pore, Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Israel, Oman, and Peru.44 In 2004,
when Congress was debating the DR-CAFTA, the United States had
employed three different models for drafting labor rights provisions:
(1) the 1993 NAFTA provisions were drafted as a side agreement, and
sanctions were allowed for only some of the standards; (2) the 2001
Jordan FTA placed the provisions within the main body of the text
and subjected them to sanctions via the FTA’s dispute resolution
mechanism; and (3) the 2004 DR-CAFTA and the five FTAs enacted
between the DR-CAFTA and the Jordan FTA also placed the labor
provisions in the body of the text,45 however, the dispute resolution
mechanism is separate from the mechanism that is used for economic
38. United States-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Sess. 6–7 (2005) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Finance].
39. DR-CAFTA FALLS SHORT, supra note 11, at 2–3 (stating that DR-CAFTA is a step
backward from the U.S.-Jordan FTA).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 4–5.
42. BOLLE, supra note 12, at 1–2.
43. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 13,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993) [hereinafter NAALC].
44. U.S. Trade Representative, Free Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
45. BOLLE, supra note 12, at 2.
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violations and only allows penalties if a country fails to enforce its own
laws.46
The fact that the DR-CAFTA includes labor provisions within the
main body of the Agreement shows a level of commitment to the pro-
visions that might be lacking when they are drafted as a side agree-
ment—an afterthought. Much of the power of the Jordan FTA’s labor
provisions is because labor violations are treated with the same en-
forcement mechanism as an economic violation.47 This is where DR-
CAFTA’s commitment starts to break down; because violations of do-
mestic labor laws are not given the same sanctions as violations of the
economic provisions, enforcement of them becomes less of a priority
to member states.48 A comparison of DR-CAFTA with its predecessors
reveals that DR-CAFTA protects fewer labor rights than the NAALC
and has a much weaker dispute resolution mechanism than the Jor-
dan FTA. As a result, DR-CAFTA cannot be seen to advance labor
rights protection.
A. Passage of Free Trade Agreements
NAFTA and DR-CAFTA were both passed with Congressional ap-
proval, but with very different levels of Congressional participation.
Where NAFTA was combed through and debated, the DR-CAFTA was
hardly debated and passed amid intense protests.49 Although other
countries might consider FTAs to be treaties, the United States does
not. In the United States, FTAs are passed under a congressional-exec-
utive agreement, which only requires a majority vote in both Houses.50
Conversely, passage of a treaty requires a two-thirds vote of the Sen-
ate.51 Additionally, DR-CAFTA was negotiated under the “fast track”
authority.52 As such, Congress had limited debate time, was only able
to vote yes or no to the Agreement, and could not amend or modify
46. Id.
47. Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000,
41 I.L.M. 63, art. 17, at 77–78 [hereinafter Jordan FTA]; BOLLE, supra note 12, at 2.
48. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.6(6).
49. Implementation of the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Sess. 35 (2005) [hereinafter DR-CAFTA Hearing
Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means], available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/
arms/hearing0405/hearing0405.pdf; DR-CAFTA Hearing Before S. Comm. on Finance, supra
note 38.
50. Brandie Ballard Wade, CAFTA-DR Labor Provisions: Why They Fail Workers and Pro-
vide Dangerous  for the FTAA, 13 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 645, 653 (2007).
51. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
52. Wade, supra note 50, at 652.
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controversial provisions.53 The fast track authority was not authorized
at the time NAFTA was passed.54 Therefore, NAFTA took seven years
to negotiate while DR-CAFTA took only one year.55 Proponents of the
fast track authority assert that it gives the President added credibility
during negotiations with other parties because he has ultimate negoti-
ating authority so long as congressional oversight procedures are
met.56
Fast track authority requires the President to make workers’
rights a primary objective during trade negotiations.57 In theory, this
should satisfy the concerns of labor organizations and Congress. How-
ever, this was not the case with DR-CAFTA, as it faced fierce opposi-
tion in Congress over labor concerns during the negotiations.58
Because of the fast track authority, legislators were not free to amend
the Agreement to strengthen its labor provisions. The Agreement only
passed by a narrow majority in the House and Senate, which demon-
strates a weak commitment from Congress and calls into question the
strength of the labor provisions.
B. Where the Labor Provisions Are Located
The United States has increased the legitimacy of labor provi-
sions in FTAs over time by taking them out of separate side agree-
ments, and placing them in the main body of the text. In NAFTA, the
labor and environmental provisions were excluded from the main
body of the agreement, and instead were added as a side agreement—
the NAALC.59 The fact that this agreement is not included within the
body of the text calls into question its legitimacy and effectiveness—
the labor provisions are effectively sidelined to economic interests.60
By contrast, the Jordan FTA, signed in October 2000, had the labor
53. Id. at 653.
54. Id. at 652.
55. Id.
56. LAEL BRAINARD & HAL SHAPIRO, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, POLICY BRIEF NO. 91:
FAST TRACK TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (2001), www.brookings.edu/views/papers/brainard/
20011107.pdf.
57. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, §§ 2102(a)(6), 2102 (b)(11)(A), 116 Stat.
933, 994, 1000 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3802(a)(6), 3802 (b)(11) (2006)).
58. See DR-CAFTA Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways & Means, supra note 49, at 35; DR-
CAFTA Hearing Before S. Comm. on Finance, supra note 38, at 25–26.
59. NAALC, supra note 43, Annex I.
60. ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECON POL’Y INST., THE HIGH PRICE OF ‘FREE’ TRADE: NAFTA’S
FAILURE HAS COST THE UNITED STATES JOBS ACROSS THE NATION 1 (2003), available at http:/
/www.epinet.org/content.cfm/briefingpapers_bp147.
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provisions written directly into the main body of the agreement.61
Since this agreement was passed, the standard has been to include
labor provisions within the main body of the text.62 DR-CAFTA follows
the Jordan FTA model of including labor and environmental provi-
sions within the main body of text.63 DR-CAFTA is thus an improve-
ment from the NAFTA model.
C. How Labor Rights Are Defined
The International Labor Organization (“ILO”) defines and over-
sees international labor standards, and works with member states to
“ensure that labour standards are respected in practice.”64 The ILO
sets out these standards in the Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and its Follow Up (“Declaration”).65 Specifically,
the Declaration addresses four main areas that are considered labor
rights: (1) the freedom of association and right to organize; (2) elimi-
nation of forced or compulsory labor; (3) abolition of child labor; and
(4) elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation.66
FTAs should address these four categories of rights. Yet, NAFTA’s
NAALC, DR-CAFTA, and the Jordan FTA differ in how they define a
labor right.67
NAALC’s Article 1(b) states that its objective is to “promote, to
the maximum extent possible, the labor principles set out in Annex
1.”68 Annex 1 then sets out eleven basic labor principles: (1) freedom
of association; (2) collective bargaining; (3) the right to strike; (4)
prohibition of forced labor; (5) protection for children and young
persons; (6) minimum employment standards, such as minimum wage
61. Jordan FTA, supra note 47, art. 6.
62. KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT, INST. FOR INT’L ECON. NO. 03-7, LABOR STANDARDS AND
THE FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS 14 (2003), available at http://www.iie.com/publica-
tions/wp/03-7.pdf .
63. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.
64. About the ILO, http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/lang—en/index.htm
(last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
65. See generally Int’l Labour Org. (“ILO”), ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work and Annex, 37 I.L.M 1233 (1998) [hereinafter ILO Declaration], available
at http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang—en/index.htm.
66. See id.; ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention
(1948); ILO, Forced Labour Convention (1930); ILO, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention
(1957); ILO, Minimum Age Convention (1973); ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention
(1999).
67. The definition of a labor right facilitates or limits the content of a claim. For
instance, if the agreement did not list the right of association as a labor right, then a party
could not claim a violation of the right of association.
68. NAALC, supra note 43, Annex 1.
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and equal pay; (7) prohibition of employment discrimination; (8)
equal pay for men and women; (9) prevention of occupational inju-
ries and illnesses; (10) compensation for occupational injuries and ill-
nesses; and (11) protection of migrant workers.69 These standards
comply with those set out by the ILO and address all four relevant
categories in detail.
In contrast, the Jordan FTA and DR-CAFTA define labor rights
much more narrowly. For example, DR-CAFTA only allows claims re-
garding (1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bar-
gain collectively; (3) a prohibition on forced or compulsory labor; (4)
minimum ages for child employment and elimination of the worst
forms of child labor; and (5) acceptable minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health.70 The Jordan FTA differs
only in that it does not include eliminating the worst forms of child
labor.71 Although both DR-CAFTA and the Jordan FTA comply with
the first three prongs of the ILO definition of labor, they fail to ad-
dress employment discrimination. In addition, they fall critically short
of the expansive definition given in the NAALC. Most notably, they
both specifically exclude any mention of equal pay for men and wo-
men, or migrant workers’ rights. As a result, a Haitian worker in the
Dominican Republic will find little relief for employment discrimina-
tion, or violations of their rights as migrants under the DR-CAFTA
labor rights definition. This oversight is a substantial limitation to the
enforcement of labor rights for Haitians in the Dominican Republic.
D. Obligations for Parties
Although NAALC’s Annex 1 announces eleven protected rights,
it does not elevate these definitions to minimum standards that need
to be met by all member states:
The following are guiding principles that the Parties are commit-
ted to promote, subject to each Party’s domestic law, but do not
establish common minimum standards for their domestic law.
They indicate broad areas of concern where the Parties have devel-
oped, each in its own way, laws, regulations, procedures and prac-
tices that protect the rights and interests of their respective
workforces.72
Thus, the Annex considers the rights as “guiding principles,” and
domestic law will inevitably trump its provisions. Similarly, NAALC Ar-
69. Id.
70. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.8.
71. Jordan FTA, supra note 47, art. 6.6.
72. NAALC, supra note 43, Annex 1.
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ticle 2 only requires a party to enforce its own laws and “ensure that its
labor laws and regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent
with high quality and productivity workplaces, and shall continue to
strive to improve those standards in that light.”73 Therefore, although
international labor standards are encouraged, the NAALC requires a
country to enforce only its own domestic laws.
DR-CAFTA, like NAALC and the Jordan FTA, requires that coun-
tries enforce only their domestic labor laws: “A Party shall not fail to
effectively enforce its labor laws, through a sustained or recurring
course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade between the
Parties, after the date of entry into force of this Agreement.”74 This
standard is more complicated than that of the NAALC, requiring sev-
eral elements not included in the NAALC. Under DR-CAFTA, a claim-
ant would have to prove that the government (1) failed to enforce, (2)
its own labor laws, (3) in a sustained or recurring way, and (4) in a
manner affecting trade between these parties.75 A migrant worker in
the Dominican Republic rarely has official documentation or formal
education, and is therefore unlikely to have the capacity to demon-
strate recurring violations of labor rights.76 They may also have little
knowledge of whether or how the labor violation might affect trade.
This makes it much more difficult to bring a claim under DR-CAFTA
than under the NAALC.
E. Sanctions
NAFTA’s NAALC, DR-CAFTA, and the Jordan FTA differ consid-
erably in the penalties associated with violating each agreement.
Under the NAALC, only a violation of occupational safety and health,
minimum wage, or child labor standards are penalized.77 The fine for
a violation is up to fifteen million dollars the first year and a suspen-
sion of NAFTA benefits if the fine is not paid.78 Violations of freedom
of association, the right to organize, and collective bargaining are sub-
ject to cooperative consultation between the parties.79
73. Id. art. 2.
74. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.2.1(a); NAALC, supra note 43; Jordan FTA, supra
note 47, art. 6.4(a).
75. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art 16.2.1(a).
76. See ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 1.
77. BOLLE, supra note 12, at 2; Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, The “Helping Hand” in Trade
Agreements: An Analysis of and Proposal for Labor Provisions in U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 16
FLA. J. INT’L L. 845, 877 (2004).
78. Wade, supra note 50, at 667.
79. Pagnattaro, supra note 77, at 877.
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The Jordan FTA authorizes sanctions for a violation of any of its
labor provisions.80 This includes failure to uphold ILO principles or
domestic laws.81 Labor provisions are treated like economic violations,
and both use the same dispute resolution mechanism, which elevates
a labor violation to the same seriousness as an economic one.82 This
means that the parties to the agreement have the same degree of mo-
tivation to comply with the labor provisions as they do to comply with
the economic provisions. This provides substantial support for labor
rights enforcement and is the strongest level of labor protection in a
U.S. FTA to date. Unfortunately, no subsequent FTA has followed the
Jordan model in allowing sanctions for violations of the agreement’s
labor provisions.
On the contrary, only certain labor violations under DR-CAFTA
are subject to a dispute resolution mechanism.83 Article 16 states that
parties shall “strive to ensure” that international standards are applied
domestically84 and may not weaken labor protections to encourage
trade or investment.85 But these provisions are virtually unenforceable
because neither fines nor sanctions can be applied to violations of
these international standard.86 Sanctions may only apply to a country
that violates its existing laws.87 This is described under Article 16.6,
which outlines that countries must resort to consultation for disputes
arising under 16.2(1)(a) before moving to the dispute resolution
body.88 The text does not list, and thus does not permit the resolution
of disputes arising under any other section, which excludes violations
of international standards from ever reaching the dispute resolution
body. Additionally, the monetary damages are capped at fifteen mil-
lion dollars per year, which is not payable to the afflicted party, but is
placed in a fund to improve labor conditions in the defending coun-
try.89 Suspension of economic benefits would be possible only if this
fee is not paid.90 DR-CAFTA envisions a narrower view of labor rights
than the NAALC, and provides a substantially weaker enforcement
provision than the Jordan FTA. Thus, it cannot be considered a legiti-
80. Wade, supra note 50, at 3; see also Jordan FTA, supra note 47, art. 17.
81. Wade, supra note 50; see also Jordan FTA, supra note 47, art. 6(1).
82. Wade, supra note 50.
83. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 20.
84. Id. art. 16.1(1).
85. Id. art. 16.2 (2).
86. Wade, supra note 50, at 2.
87. Id.
88. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.6.
89. Id. art. 20.
90. Id.
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mate step forward for workers’ rights. It may in fact be a step
backwards.
III. Free Trade Labor Provisions—Do They Work?
A. The Realities of NAFTA
In terms of labor rights, particularly in Mexico, NAFTA has not
fulfilled its promise. When NAFTA took effect on January 1, 1994, it
eliminated duties on half of all goods sent from the United States to
Mexico and phased out other tariffs over five to fifteen years.91 In ad-
dition, all non-tariff agricultural trade barriers between the two coun-
tries were removed, and most of the barriers between the United
States and Canada were scheduled for removal by January 1, 1998.92
For investors, NAFTA offered provisions intended to stimulate foreign
investment, encourage the relocation of factories and jobs, and pro-
mote deregulation and privatization of basic services, such as water
and energy.93 These methods could expose a country to economic in-
stability and job loss and arguably promote a “race to the bottom”—an
exploitation of human and natural resources for the benefit of indus-
try and investors. Inevitably, NAFTA was sold on promises of high-
wage American jobs, an increased living standard in all three coun-
tries, and a healthier Mexico that could serve as a better market for
importing goods to the United States.94
The reality of NAFTA has been very different. Today, fewer Mexi-
can workers hold regular paying jobs than before the agreement.95
Real wages have sharply plummeted, and with job shortages in Mex-
ico, the number of Mexicans seeking work in the United States has
more than doubled.96 According to the Mexican government, more
than half the population of Mexico makes less than the amount neces-
sary to cover basic needs like food, housing, and health care.97 This
reality is very different than the one of a hearty industry promised by
proponents of NAFTA.98
91. Wade, supra note 50, at 648.
92. Id.
93. PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE TEN YEAR TRACK RECORD OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: THE MEXICAN ECONOMY, AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT 1 (2003),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/NAFTA_10_mexico.pdf.
94. Id.
95. SCOTT, supra note 60, at 10.
96. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 93.
97. Wade, supra note 50, at 648–49.
98. See SCOTT, supra note 60.
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B. Jordan After the Agreement
The Jordan FTA phased out tariffs over nine years with the goal
of eliminating duties on almost all products by 2010.99 Its provisions
for the enforcement of workers’ rights are by far the strongest of any
U.S. FTA in that sanctions can apply to any violation of domestic and
international labor laws.100 However, since the agreement came into
effect, the National Labor Committee, a U.S.-based NGO, has released
a series of reports that show a proliferation of sweatshop conditions in
Jordan’s export zones.101 This proliferation can be attributed to the
boom in apparel manufacturing caused by the Jordan FTA.102 The
reports document complaints by foreign workers of twenty-hour work
days, lack of pay, and physical abuse by supervisors; these workers pro-
duce garments for American retailers, including Target and Wal-
Mart.103 More recent reports have alleged that Israeli businessmen are
running Jordanian sweatshops that employ workers trafficked from
Bangladesh, subjecting them to minimal pay and physical abuse.104
These reports are not necessarily proof that the Jordan FTA labor
provisions have failed, because the possibility of imposing sanctions
through the agreement has not yet been attempted. They do call into
question whether labor protections in a FTA are adequate enough to
protect workers from the influx of industry foreseen by the agree-
ment. Finally, if a country with relatively strong labor standards can
devolve into sweatshop scandals in export zones within a couple years
of a FTA, then it does not bode well for a country like the Dominican
Republic, which already has negligible protections.
C. Is DR-CAFTA Destined for the Same Fate?
Compared to the Jordan FTA, DR-CAFTA labor provisions do not
enforce compliance with international labor standards.105 The Agree-
99. Jordan FTA, supra note 47, Annex 2.1.
100. See supra Part II.
101. Charles Kernaghan, Nat’l Labor Comm., U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
Stumbles, NAT’L LABOR COMM., July 24, 2009, http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/head-
lines.cfm?refID=106500; NLC’s Response to Recent Jordanian Ministry of Labor Report on
the Musa Factory, NAT’L LABOR COMM., Aug. 13, 2009, http://www.nlcnet.org/article.php?
id=666.
102. Id.
103. Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in
Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C1.
104. Dana Weiler-Polak, Report: Israeli Businessmen Running Sweatshop in Jordan,
HAARETZ.COM, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1106389.html;
Kernaghan, supra note 101.
105. See supra Part II.
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ment does not require improvement in domestic labor laws, nor does
it provide sufficient incentive to enforce existing domestic labor
laws.106 All of the signatories to the DR-CAFTA also members of the
ILO, which defines clear labor standards for member states.107 These
standards are merely guidelines.108 Unfortunately, Central American
countries often do not comply with these international standards.109
Since DR-CAFTA relies on countries to enforce their own existing la-
bor obligations, there is no added motivation for a country to increase
their compliance with ILO standards, particularly if lowered standards
can be used to attract foreign investment. One concern is that the
labor provisions fail to promote basic labor rights enforcement. For
example, there is no protection against discrimination in the work-
place.110 The elimination of employment and workplace discrimina-
tion is one of the four core labor rights expounded by the ILO
Declaration.111
If the NAALC and the Jordan FTA have not succeeded in benefit-
ing the workforce needed to fuel their economic vision, then it is diffi-
cult to imagine that DR-CAFTA will succeed in improving workers’
rights in the Dominican Republic. Unfortunately, as the Dominican
economy expands under the Agreement, it is likely that poor labor
standards will be reinforced, if not worsened. Those at the bottom of
the workforce, many of them Haitian migrants, may be forced to bear
the brunt of economic expansion, while experiencing little benefit
themselves.
IV. Dominican Law and the Prospect of Labor Rights
Enforcement Through DR-CAFTA
DR-CAFTA does not require the Dominican Republic to comply
with international labor standards, nor does it require improvement
of domestic laws. It does require that the country uphold its own labor
laws.112 In sum, the country’s labor laws cannot be challenged
106. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, arts. 16.2, paras. (1), (2).
107. See ILO Declaration, supra note 65; ILO, Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organise Convention (1948); ILO, Forced Labour Convention (1930); ILO, Abolition of
Forced Labour Convention (1957); ILO, Minimum Age Convention (1973); ILO, Worst Forms of
Child Labour Convention (1999).
108. ILO Declaration, supra note 65.
109. DR-CAFTA FALLS SHORT, supra note 11, at 4–5.
110. See DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.8 (The article does not include employment
discrimination in its definition of labor law.).
111. ILO Declaration, supra note 65, at 1238.
112. See supra Part II.
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through the dispute resolution mechanism even if they violate inter-
national or DR-CAFTA standards. Violations of domestic laws will only
be redressed if they are recurring and directly affect trade with the
relevant party.113
A. Laws that Violate DR-CAFTA and International Standards
Unfortunately, many of the Dominican Republic’s labor laws fall
short of the standards promoted by the ILO and DR-CAFTA Article
16, and these violations may be aggravated by the influx of labor
needed to fulfill the vision of the DR-CAFTA. For example, although
the Dominican constitution provides for the right of association and
the right to organize, the Labor Code’s provision for union members
falls short of international standards.114
Sugar is the Dominican Republic’s second most important export
after mining,115 and exports stand to increase under DR-CAFTA.116
Unfortunately, the treatment of sugar cane workers is a particular
problem for Haitian immigrants, who make up sixty percent of the
agricultural labor force.117 The law provides significantly fewer bene-
fits for those who work in the sugar cane industry. For example, based
on a ten-hour day, the average minimum wage for farm workers is 150
pesos per day.118 The U.S. 2008 State Department Human Rights Re-
port on the Dominican Republic (“Report”) deemed this wage an in-
adequate amount to provide a decent standard of living for workers
and their families.119 Sugar cane workers are given even less: the mini-
mum wage is ninety-five pesos per day.120 This treatment places Hai-
tian sugar cane workers at a marked disadvantage to farm workers and
guarantees that they will be unable to provide a decent standard of
living for their family.
Female workers represent a majority in Dominican free trade
zones,121 and yet, the U.S. Department of State identified that the
country has “no effective government programs to combat economic
113. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.2(a).
114. Id.
115. ILLEGAL PEOPLE, supra note 1, sec. III.
116. U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts: Fact Sheet on Sugar in CAFTA-DR
(2005).
117. Roebling, supra note 4.
118. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 6.e.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. DR-CAFTA FALLS SHORT, supra note 11.
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discrimination against women.”122 This is a worrying oversight since
women represent a group that has historically faced workplace dis-
crimination. There are some instances where domestic laws are ig-
nored. Dominican law provides that women have the same status as
men, and sexual harassment in the workplace is chargeable with a mis-
demeanor.123 However, union leaders report that sexual harassment
remains a problem.124 In addition, women often receive less pay than
men for comparable work, and some employers regularly give preg-
nancy tests before hiring women.125 Even though it is illegal to dis-
criminate based on these tests, NGOs have reported that pregnant
women were often not hired, and women who became pregnant were
often fired.126 Unfortunately, female workers face an additional hur-
dle in that under DR-CAFTA, employment discrimination is not a cov-
ered labor right and cannot be challenged. Even if the Dominican
Republic violates its own domestic laws protecting women in the work-
place, a DR-CAFTA claim is likely to fail because the topic is not enu-
merated under the definition of protected labor rights.
These issues exemplify Dominican laws that violate international
labor standards, but cannot be challenged via DR-CAFTA. A consider-
ation of the enforcement of domestic law is more encouraging, as it
may be an area where a successful challenge is possible.
B. Violations of Dominican Laws
In many instances, Dominican labor laws are systematically vio-
lated; they are thus better candidates for challenges brought under
DR-CAFTA.127 To bring a complaint, a party must show the following:
the government (1) failed to enforce, (2) their own labor laws, (3) in
a sustained or recurring way, (4) and in a manner affecting trade be-
tween these parties.128 One problem that affects the enforcement of
many Dominican labor laws is abuse by those in power. Consider the
following:
Police officers, who are charged with the protection of the general
population, frequently overlook the mistreatment of the Haitians,
and often even contribute to it. Despite these egregious violations,
the Haitian government usually does not condemn the conditions
122. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 5.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra Part II.E.
128. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.2(a).
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that its nationals are forced to tolerate out of fear of losing the
remittances sent home by migrant workers to their families back in
Haiti which considerably helps to defray the shortcomings of Ha-
iti’s own weak economy. The fact is that while the Dominican Re-
public is in need of cheap Haitian labor for their agricultural
sector, it continues to complain about the negatives of their
presence.129
Such abuses of authority, which violate enumerated labor rights,
might be successfully challenged under DR-CAFTA.
Sugar cane workers, in particular, are often subject to violations
of domestic law.130 For instance, the law establishes a maximum work
period of forty-four hours per week.131 But sugar cane workers are
usually paid by the weight of the cane, rather than by the number of
hours they worked.132 Many cane workers report fraud by weighing
station operators in the Report: they alleged that they were often not
provided trucks at the end of the day, leading to the sugar cane drying
overnight and losing much of its weight by the next morning.133 This
reduced their already low wages, and could qualify as a violation of
minimum wage requirements. In addition, sugar cane harvesting is a
seasonal occupation; during the off-season, sugar plantations often
provide work that falls below minimum wage.134 Even during the main
season, less able-bodied workers who could not produce as much cane
per day often receive less than minimum wage for their work.135 These
are all examples of labor law as defined under DR-CAFTA Article 16.8,
which defines the enforcement of an acceptable minimum wage as a
type of labor law.136
There have also been widespread reports of employer intimida-
tion to stop union activities in free trade zones, in violation of Article
16.8 which requires the right of association and right to organize and
bargain collectively.137 Health conditions of sugar cane workers in the
Dominican Republic are also a cause for concern. According to the
129. Kaitlin Porter, Stateless in the Dominican Republic, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS,
http://www.coha.org/2009/08/stateless-in-the-dominican-republic/ (last visited Mar. 20,
2010).
130. Id.
131. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 6.e.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.8.
137. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 6.b.
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Report, those who live in the bateyes138 have inadequate schools, med-
ical facilities, running water, and sewage systems.139 In some cases,
workers were denied medical attention or pensions even though de-
ductions had been taken from their wages.140 These violations could
fall under Article 16.8’s acceptable conditions of work, which includes
occupational safety and health.141 Violations of these rights can be
challenged under DR-CAFTA so long as the challenger can prove sus-
tained or recurring action, or inaction, on the part of the govern-
ment, and that the policy affected trade.142 Since the United States is
another producer of sugar, it is plausible that the violations could
have affected trade between the parties. For instance, if union intimi-
dation, or inadequate health care is allowing Dominican sugar pro-
ducers to produce a less expensive product, then it theoretically could
hurt the American sugar market and satisfy this condition.
The Dominican Ministry of Labor has inspectors who must en-
force labor standards.143 Workers reported that these inspectors were
not properly trained and did not respond to health and safety com-
plaints.144 Workers also felt they could not remove themselves from
hazardous working conditions without losing their employment, even
though the law requires that employers provide a safe working envi-
ronment.145 Again, evidence of failure to enforce domestic labor laws,
such as health and safety requirements, could be used to bring a claim
under DR-CAFTA provided the evidence demonstrates an affect on
trade.146
The Dominican Republic also prohibits involuntary servitude, but
the Report found that “mandatory overtime . . . was sometimes en-
forced through locked doors or loss of pay or employment for those
who refused.”147 Trafficking of persons is illegal, and yet the Report
found “reports of trafficking in children within the country.”148 The
Council on Hemispheric Affairs states more specific numbers: “[i]n
2008, approximately 3,000 street children of Haiti were trafficked to
138. A shantytown or sugarcane work camp. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5,
sec. 6.d.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.8.
142. Id. art. 16.2(a).
143. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 6.d.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. DR-CAFTA, supra note 7, art. 16.2(a).
147. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 6.c.
148. Id.
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the Dominican Republic for a variety of purposes, such as agricultural
and domestic services, begging on the streets, slave labor, or prostitu-
tion.”149 In fact, child labor is a continuing problem in the country. In
October 2008, the United Nations Children’s Fund reported that
9.7% of minors between the ages of ten and seventeen were working
illegally.150
While these statistics are grim, they point to areas where labor
rights might be improved through a DR-CAFTA claim. Unfortunately,
there are several obstacles to overcome before this can happen. First,
a party to the Agreement would have to bring the complaint, which
raises political issues. The United States has the political clout to over-
come this problem, but it is unlikely that the any White House admin-
istration would have the political will to do so unless a labor violation
substantially and negatively affected our economy. Second, it could be
difficult to prove that the violation was recurring unless a third party,
such as an NGO, took notice and worked alongside laborers to gather
evidence for the claim. Since Haitian workers are also denied access to
basic public services and education, they are the least likely group to
have the ability to record violations or to know how to recognize a
violation. Finally, proving that a labor violation directly affects trade
with a party might create an insurmountable barrier since labor viola-
tions are unlikely to produce such a huge economic effect that they
would alter a trading relationship.
Conclusion
By increasing trade, DR-CAFTA seeks to create greater import
and export capabilities between the member states. This is an effort
that will require human power to fuel the foreseen economic growth.
In the Dominican Republic, some of the sectors expected to profit
from the Agreement rely heavily on workers of Haitian descent, who
are systematically disenfranchised and discriminated against in the
country. Although many have argued it will help improve labor stan-
dards, DR-CAFTA will continue to permit the systematic exploitation
of workers and immigrants in the Dominican Republic. The effect will
be to maintain a racial hierarchy and a de facto caste system within the
country. Many violations of domestic law in the Dominican Republic
could theoretically be challenged under the DR-CAFTA dispute reso-
lution mechanism. However, there are loopholes that make this in-
149. Porter, supra note 129.
150. 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 5, sec. 6.c.
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credibly difficult. Furthermore, the limited scope of labor rights
under the Agreement, as compared to the broader scope of the
NAALC, significantly reduces the types of claims that can be brought.
Although it was sold as a proud step forward for labor rights enforce-
ment, this Agreement offers little benefit for the people who are
needed to fuel the economic growth that it promises.
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